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Abstract
We propose an agent-based computational model of bank runs. In the model, synchronization
eﬀects, which generate bank runs, can arise from imitation among depositors. There are three
important interacting factors which inﬂuence the patient agents’ strategies (withdraw or wait),
the proportion of patient agents, the activation threshold, and the interaction neighborhood of
agents. We study the question of how frequently bank runs might occur or of what features of
interaction mechanism might minimize their frequency.
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1. Introduction
Bank runs is an important economic phenomenon. In its history, the United Sates experienced
many bank runs. Twelve of them took place between the beginning of the nineteenth century and
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 [1, 2]. Yet, the 1932-1933 banking
panic is still one of the most striking events. More recently, the banking system in Mexico, Asia,
Argentina, and Russia experienced a partial run or temporary closure. The UK bank Northern
Rock was the most high-proﬁle casualty of the credit crisis of 2007 when it suﬀered its depositor
run in September which lead to its rescue by the Bank of England. There were some events in
modern ﬁnancial markets which have been described as being fundamentally similar to a run on
a bank; the collapse of the U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008 is one of several
recent examples.
Increasing the stability of the ﬁnancial system has been one of the main goals of regulation.
Hence getting a better insight into bank runs which leads to new directions in research. First of
all, theoretical works have been undertaken on random withdraw theory. The seminal work of
Diamond and Dybvig [3] has brought a theoretical foundation to the pure-panic (or self-fulﬁlling)
bank runs. In these models, panics were caused by unexpected withdraw by depositor even
because of sunspots [4]. The second works have been labeled asymmetric information theory.
In these works, depositors seek to withdraw from banks when they have reasons to believe that
banks are more likely to fail [5, 6].
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Correspondingly, how to stop bank runs or prevent them has been a major focus of research.
There are two Nash equilibria in the original version of D-D model. In one equilibrium bank
runs never occur because the depositors withdraw their funds only if they need to. In the other
equilibrium, however, all depositors rush to withdraw because they fear the bank will run out of
funds. These actions cause the bank to fail, fulﬁlling the original beliefs. A bank run can then be
interpreted as a switch from the good equilibrium to the bad one. The deposit insurance has been
described as a source of stability for banking system which is theoretically founded [2, 7, 8],
while other research, within the same trend, granted unquestionable virtues to mechanisms of
suspension of the convertibility [4, 6, 9].
Theoretical work on bank runs was aimed at answering the following questions: How can
bank contracts be optimal if such contracts lead to bank runs? Does suspension of deposit con-
vertibility make it possible to prevent the bank run? Yet another important question is: what is
the cause of bank runs? This question has not been answered in D-D model. It is not settled
yet whether these bank runs reﬂect the probability distributions of exogenous shocks hitting the
banking system or whether they are related to the inherent interaction among depositors. For
example, it is widely believed that banks are vulnerable to collective behavior whereby a large
group of depositors withdraw simultaneously. Such collective behavior could reﬂect the phe-
nomenon known as herding which occurs when agents take actions on the basis of imitating
each other [10–12]. A variety of agent-based model have been proposed in the last few years to
study ﬁnancial system [13–16]. In this paper, we propose an agent-based computational model
to analyze the interaction mechanism to the D-D model. To model how the decisions of agents
are inﬂuenced by their mutual interaction, this paper assumes a simple communication structure
based on ideas from statistical physics in which agents occupy the nodes of a lattice and are
inﬂuenced by the decisions of their neighbors. We will relax some of their assumptions. Our
model suggests an endogenous mechanism for imitation among depositors which may lead to
bank runs. We also study the question of how frequently bank runs might occur or of what fea-
tures of interaction mechanism might minimize their frequency. In our model, a large proportion
of patient agents, a large activation threshold, and a large interaction neighborhood of agents
could prevent bank runs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents D-D model and its
developments, section 3 describes the model, section 4 discusses results and section 5 concludes.
2. D-D model theoretical framework
Diamond and Dybvig [3] have provided us with the classic benchmark model for bank runs.
They insist on the fragile of banking system due to the transformation of illiquid claims into
liquid claims. It is possible for depositors to lead to bank runs which is response to the liquidity
service provided by bank. The D-D model has three periods (T = 0, 1, 2). A technology is
available in period 0 which can transform the period 0 good to period 1 and period 2 goods.
The productive yields R > 1 units of output in period 2 for each unit of input in period 0. But
if production is interrupted in period 1, the salvage value is just the initial investment. The
productive technology is represented by
T = 0 T = 1 T = 2
−1
{
0
1
{
R
0
(1)
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There are two types of depositors in the model, the ﬁrst type of agents named impatient
depositor who need consume in period 1 and the other type of agents named patient depositor
who need consume in period 2. Each agent’s type is determined in period 1 and revealed privately
to the agent. All depositors face the risk to be impatient agent in period 0. Banks provide the
demand deposit contract would allow agents to insure against the unlucky outcome of being a
type 1 agent. The demand deposit contract gives each agent withdrawing in period 1 a ﬁxed
claim of r1 per unit deposited in period 0, where R > r1 > 1. Let Vi be the period i payoﬀ per unit
of deposit withdraw, while V1 depends on one’s place in service line and the number of withdraw
in period 1. These are given by
V1( f j, r1) =
{
r1 if f j < r−11
0 if f j ≥ r−11
(2)
V2( f , r1) = max{R(1 − r1 f )/(1 − f ), 0} (3)
where f j is the number of bank’s depositors being served before agent j as a fraction of the
total number of agents and f is the number of bank’s depositors being served in period 1 as a
fraction of the total number of agents. Patient agents get a higher payoﬀ from which they can
withdraw when no patient agents withdraw in period 1, while get nothing when many patient
agents withdraw in period 1 which leads to a bank run.
Banking system works well if impatient agents withdraw in period 1 and patient agents wait.
In this case, the bank assets will be suﬃcient to meet all the liquidity demands. If all patient
agents predict many depositors will come to withdraw, they will behave in the same way. Because
patient depositors do not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to change their strategy if the others do not do it once
in the logic of self-fulﬁlling panic. The problem is that anything that causes depositors to predict
bank run will lead to a run. It is a pure and strict strategy Nash equilibrium. Fundamentally, this
type of panic is consequence of lost conﬁdence.
There is another strict Nash equilibrium that all patient depositors do not withdraw in period
1and do it in period 2. Such equilibrium occurs if all patient agents predict the others will
withdraw in period 2. In D-D model, they increase their level of utility by withdraw in period 2
because their level of withdrawal can be higher by waiting.
In the Temzelides [17] model the original setup of D-D model is extend to a repeated game
environment. This following work provides the theoretical foundation for our interaction model.
The latter proposes a simple model, that is, a study of the relation between bank runs and the
proportion of patient agent, the activation threshold of agents, and the interaction neighborhood
of agents. In that respect, it is a study of banking panics spread among agents.
3. The interaction model
A modiﬁed version of the Ising model is presented to describe the decision making of depos-
itors. An external inﬂuence is shown which have a drastic eﬀect on the decision of depositors.
Individual preference is introduced as the personal activation thresholds which inﬂuences the lo-
cal interaction. We consider agents interacting within a two-dimensional square lattice network
where each node represents a depositor and the links represent the connections among agents.
Each agent is connected to his four nearest neighbors, the ones above, below, left and right. Pe-
riodical boundary conditions are adopted so that the agents at the top of the lattice are linked to
those at the bottom and the agents at the left side are linked to those at the right side. In this way
the lattice assumes the topology of a torus.
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Figure 1: The interaction neighborhood with D = 2.
Here we give a detailed description of the model. As we mentioned above, the main pur-
pose of this paper is discussing the interaction mechanism, and then we will relax some original
assumptions.
3.1. Period
Each period is divided into three subperiods: period 0, period 1, and period 2.
3.2. Population and endowments
There are m agents in the system. Each agent is owned one unit of good in period 0, then
some of them need consume in period 1 (impatient agent) while others need consume in period
2 (patient agent). In our model, we assume that all agents put their good into the bank in period
0. There is only one bank in our model. Let the proportion of patient agents is p, so the number
of patient agents is n = m × p. Each agent has uninsurable risk of being of type 1 or type
2 in period 0, because the type is determined in period 1. In addition, all agents can store
consumption goods at no cost. While impatient agents always withdraw in period 1, only patient
agents are “strategic” players who are likely withdraw in period 1 according to the expression
of Temzelides [17]. Consequently, we study the coordination player by patient agents choosing
either to withdraw in period 1 or to wait until period 2.
3.3. Interaction and imitation
All agents are identical in period 0. At the beginning of period 1, n agents are chosen to be
patient agent randomly. So there are m− n impatient agents.The patient agents’ decision making
is driven by the inﬂuence of agents within their interaction neighborhood, for example, Figure.
1 shows the cluster of agents when the radius of neighborhood D = 2.
In addition, within each period 1 patient agent repeatedly exchanges information with the
agents within his interaction neighborhood. In each imitation round each patient agent receives
a signal Wj from the agents within his interaction neighborhood which denotes the temporary
choice which can update from a imitation round to the next. Patient agent chooses an action Wj
which can take one of two values: +1 if he withdraws in period 1, 0 if he does not withdraw in
period 1. The signal S j is given by
S j =
∑
〈i, j〉
Ji jWj (4)
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〈i, j〉 denotes that the sum is taken over the set of agents within the interaction neighborhood of
agent i. Ji j is the relative propensity of agent i to be inﬂuenced by the action of his neighbor j.
It is interesting to study that how the behavior of the system is aﬀected by the diﬀerent choices
for Ji j. There are no interaction between agents if Ji j = 0. In the framework of the Cont and
Bouchaud model [12], they set Ji j = 1 with probability a and Ji j = 0 with probability 1 − a.
Zhou and Sornette [18] considered Ji j updating according to some rules. In our model, the main
results will be based on Ji j = 1 but cases where Ji j = 0 will also be considered.
The bank serves the agents who try to withdraw according to the sequential service constraint
until it runs out of funds. The sequential service constraint [4] requires that the payments to each
depositor depend on the number of depositors who have been serviced previously. The patient
agents decide whether to withdraw early if he saw some neighbors withdraw in period 1. In our
model, we assume that depositors do not know the type of their neighbors. We consider an acti-
vation threshold which each patient agent’s signal must exceed to induce him to withdraw early.
In each imitation round each patient agent compares the signal he receives with his threshold, γi,
and makes the decision
Wi =
{
1 if S i > γi
0 if S i ≤ γi (5)
The γi = q×∑〈i, j〉 j, 〈i, j〉 denotes that the number of agents within the interaction neighborhood
of agent i, 0 < q < 1. The same γi is held for each patient agent. The patient agent would
never change decision once he decides withdraw in period 1. We assume that the patient agents’
strategy are only inﬂuenced by the strategy of their neighbors, i.e., they would not withdraw in
period 1 if external signal is less than their threshold.
Initially n agents are chosen to be patient agents. Then each patient agent repeatedly ex-
change information with agents within his interaction neighborhood and update withdraw deci-
sion following the rule in Eqs. (4) and (5) until no patient agent changes his decision.
All impatient agents and the patient agents who changed their decisions withdraw at the end
of period 1 once the decision process has ﬁnished. The bank run occurs according to
(m − n + n′ ) × r1 > m (6)
where n
′
means the number of patient agents who withdraw in period 1. The bank run may
caused by the panic spread among agents which have no relation with anything fundamental
about the bank’s condition.
4. Simulation and results
We carried out agent-based simulations on the model under diﬀerent parameter values. Our
analysis focused on the relation between bank runs and the parameters.
We tested diﬀerent number of agents which led to qualitatively the same result. In this paper
the total number of depositors was set at m = 2500, so the number of patient agents was m × p.
At each beginning of period 1 m × p patient agents were chosen randomly. The r1 was ﬁxed to
1.4. All agents hold the same radius of neighborhood D. During the simulations, a record was
kept that the number of agents who withdraw in period 1. Bank run occurs if the record is larger
than 1786 which is the critical value m/r1 according to Eq. (6).
We tested diﬀerent parameter values which may lead to bank runs. The ﬁrst key parameter is
p which characterize the proportion of the patient agents. The second one is q which characterize
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Figure 2: Each red node presents an impatient agent. Each green node presents a patient agent. Each yellow node
presents a patient agent who withdraw in period 1. (a). p=0.5, Ji j=0, (b). p=0.5, q=0.4, D=1, Ji j=1, (c). p=0.6, q=0.5,
D=1, Ji j=1, (d). p=0.3, q=0.6, D=1, Ji j=1.
whether the patient agent is susceptible. The third one is D which characterize the radius of
interaction neighborhood.
The main result relates to the question whether the interaction mechanism between the agents’
behavior and their network structure (group inﬂuence) inﬂuence the banking system behavior.
4.1. An explanation of bank runs
We ﬁrst considered the case where p = 0.5, D = 1 and agents act independently, i.e., Ji j = 0
for all i and j. In this case, bank runs never occur. This is shown, for example, in Figure. 2(a)
where each red node represents an impatient depositor and each green node represents a patient
depositor. The explanation of the above result is that patient agents would not withdraw in period
1 if they do not exchange information with their neighbors. Bank runs never occur because the
number of agents withdraw in period 1 is less than 1786 (see Table 1).
Introducing imitation among agents in the model may leads to bank runs. We considered
the case where p = 0.5, D = 1, q = 0.4, and Ji j = 1. Result is shown in Figure. 2(b) where
each yellow node represents a patient depositor who changed his original strategy by the external
inﬂuence of his neighbors. In this case, a number of patient agents withdraw in period 1. The
bank runs out of funds because the number of red depositors and yellow depositors who withdraw
in period 1 is more than 1786 (see Table 1).
In addition to the cases discussed above we have looked at the case where p = 0.6, q = 0.5,
D = 1, and Ji j = 1. The result is shown in Figure. 2(c) where bank runs do not occur. The bank
can still pay r1 to each depositor who withdraws in period 1. Also we considered the case where
p = 0.3, q = 0.6, D = 1, and Ji j = 1. Again bank run was observed as shown in Figure. 2(d).
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Table 1: The impact of 4 scenarios on bank behavior.
Scenario a b c d
p 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3
q 0.4 0.5 0.6
Scope radius 1 1 1
Withdraw in period 1 1250 1902 1450 1949
Wait in period 1 1250 598 1050 551
Withdraw in period 1 (patient agent) 0 652 450 199
Bank run occur? No Yes No Yes
These results suggest that bank runs can emerge from imitation among agents, as long as a
mechanism exists for leading to patient agent withdraw in period 1. In our paper, a small propor-
tion of patient agents, a small value of activation threshold, meets this condition. A decrease in p
leads to an increase of impatient agents. A decrease in q leads to patient agents more susceptible.
Adding imitation among depositors to a scenario with adjusting the proportion of patient
agents and the activation threshold make the model capable of reconciling a large number of
patient agents withdraw in period 1. In this case, which is the main case as far as the results of
this paper are concerned, all three ingredients: imitation, the proportion of patient agents and the
activation threshold, play key roles in generating bank runs. Imitation implies that a patient agent
would withdraw in period 1 according to the external information of his neighbors. This imitative
behavior can spread through the system from one imitation round to the next, generating a large
number of patient agents withdraw in period 1. Adjusting thresholds to small values and a small
number of patient agents make the patient agents more susceptible by the external information.
Therefore, taking these three ingredients of interaction mechanism together lead to bank runs
occur.
4.2. The impact of the three interacting factors
In the following we concentrate on the impact of the three interacting factors on how fre-
quently bank runs might occur or on what features of interaction mechanism might minimize
their frequency.
We simulated the model using diﬀerent values of the proportion of patient agents, p, the
activation threshold, q, and the radius of neighborhood D. For comparison purposes we statistic
the frequency of bank runs in 1000 simulations for each group of parameters.
As shown in Figure. 3, the variant frequency of bank runs counted cumulatively over 1000
times, resulting from simulations with D = 5. We carried out simulations with the threshold q
varying from 0.3 to 0.8. As the proportion of patient agents increasing the frequency of bank runs
change from 1000 to 0 for each threshold. Bank runs never occur and the banking system spends
all the time in the optimal state when the proportion of patient agent is larger than a certain value.
Due to the inﬂuence of neighbors, more patient agents withdraw in period 1 as the proportion of
patient agents decreasing. With even a lower decrease, these withdrawals are signiﬁcant enough
to result in a bank run. Bank runs are inevitable and the banking system spends all the time in
the bank run equilibrium when the proportion of patient agent is smaller than a certain value, i.e.,
the miscoordination shift the banking system into the panic steady state.
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Figure 3: Frequency of bank runs with D=5.
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Figure 4: Frequency of bank runs. (a).D=1 (b).D=2 (c).D=3 (d).D=4.
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Figure 5: Frequency of bank runs with q=0.5. The red line presents p=0.72.
A small value of q denotes that patient agents are more susceptible. In this case, patient
agents withdraw early even with a small noise. While a large value of q denotes that patient
agents are more decisive which makes they waiting in period 1 even with a large proportion of
impatient agents.
For comparison, Figure. 4 includes results with D varying from 1 to 4 which shows diﬀerent
rates of frequency change from the panic steady state which bank runs always occur to the opti-
mal state which bank runs never occur. Figure. 4(a) and Figure. 4(b) propose a fast frequency
change of bank runs which the radius of neighborhood are small. While the frequency change
display more slow in Figure. 4(c) and Figure. 4(d) which the radius of neighborhood are larger.
Figure. 5 presents a detail description of the frequency of bank runs with D varying from 1 to 5.
The reasons are as follows. Each patient agent exchanges information with his nearest 4
neighbors when D = 1. They receive very little information from their neighbors. The infor-
mation communication exist only in a local area. Basically the strategy of patient agents are
determined by the initial state of system, i.e., the proportion of patient agents. The system state
changes from the panic steady state to the optimal state fast with the the proportion of patient
agents increase. As the radius of neighborhood D increasing, patient agents interact with more
agents, they receive more information from their neighbors. A large value of D allow patient
agents imitate across long distances. The local interaction thereby spread to a large area. The
strategy of patient agents are determined not only by the initial state of system, but also by the
information communication among agents. The patient agents make diﬀerent decisions under
information communication which lead to many intermedial states between the optimal state and
the panic steady state.
Figure. 6 shows the relation between frequency of bank runs and the radius of neighborhood
D with ﬁxed values of q and p. Under each group values of q and p, the frequency of bank
runs increase as D become large. But the frequency decrease as D continue increase when D
is larger than a certain value. The red line in Figure. 5 presents the results with q = 0.5 and
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Figure 6: Frequency of bank runs with D varying from 1 to 10.
p = 0.72. Bank runs never occur with a large proportion of patient agents when D = 1. With a
lower increase of D patient agents receive more information from their neighbors which mislead
them to withdraw in period 1. Because these inaccurate information only present the propensity
of the local area. With higher increase of D patient agents receive more accurate information
which present the propensity of the large area. In this case, patient agents do not withdraw early
which receive lower payments. Patient agents never withdraw in period 1 with a large interaction
neighborhood which present a global information.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed an agent-based computational model which can explain the cause
of bank runs. According to synchronization eﬀects in our model , which generate bank runs,
can arise from imitation among depositors, even in the absence of exogenous shock. We provide
a new way to study the question of how frequently bank runs might occur or of what features
of interaction mechanism might minimize their frequency. In our model, a large proportion of
patient agents, a large activation threshold, and a large radius of interaction neighborhood could
prevent bank runs.
Many interesting future works can be arisen in the context of our model. One of these is how
the heterogeneity across agents aﬀects the system behavior, for example, the imitation parameter,
the activation threshold and the radius of interaction neighborhood. The other one is considering
the learning process which patient agents’ strategy are inﬂuenced by the previous proﬁts in a
dynamic process. Also, given multiple banks in the model, how the bank runs spread among
banks.
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